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I ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to consider the issue of name suppression in criminal 
cases, and to discuss whether the law should be developed to allow for the 
automatic suppression of an accused's name, prior to a judgment being delivered 
on the substance of their case. This paper will examine in moderate detail the 
current New Zealand law regarding name suppression, from its origins in the 
common law, to the current day where a significant proportion of the relevant 
law is found in statute. Important to that examination will be an identification of 
considerations made by the New Zealand court when considering an application 
for suppression of name. This paper considers the broad tension which exists 
between important and competing principles, those being the principle of open 
justice and freedom of expression, against the interests of the accused including 
their privacy interest. 
The paper concludes with a discussion of the arguments for and against 
automatic suppression of name prior to a judgment being issued. The author 
concludes by supporting that the law should be developed to provide an 
automatic suppression of name for the accused, with the ability for an application 
to be made to the court to allow the release and publication of the name. 
A Statement on Word Length 
The total word count is 16 210 words, not including footnotes, abstract or 
appendices. 
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II INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the issue of pre-conviction name 
suppression, and to discuss whether New Zealand law should be developed. In 
particular, this paper will examine the issues and law surrounding name 
suppression, and discuss the concept of automatic name suppression for 
defendants in criminal proceedings, prior to a judgment on the substantive matter 
being given. The paper will begin by considering the current state of the law 
regarding suppression of information from the courts, and then consider 
arguments for and against the automatic suppression of the defendant's name. 
The New Zealand law regarding name suppression has developed in line 
with most common law jurisdictions, allowing for publication of the defendants 
name as the starting point. That is on the basis of the principle of open justice. 
An important aim of that principle is to ensure the public can ' see for 
themselves' what happens in our courts, and be assured the criminal processes 
are sound. In New Zealand a long line of cases have confirmed the importance of 
the principle of open justice. 
1 
Closely aligned to the principle of open justice is the principle of freedom 
of expression. Arguably there is a tension between those principles and the 
interests of the accused, and particularly their privacy interest. That privacy 
interest may also apply to persons associated with the defendant such as family 
members and colleagues. 
Overlying these concepts, is the fundamental principle that a person is 
innocent until proven guilty. The practical reality is that many people will 
consider a person a guilty due merely to the fact they are charged with an 
offence. It is unfortunate that for a proportion of the community, they will 
continue to view the person as blameworthy even when acquitted or if the 
charges are withdrawn. 
1 For example: Broadcasting Co,poralio11 of Ne111 Zealand vA-G [1 982] 1 NZLR 120 (CA), Le111is v Wilson 
& Horton Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 546, R II Bain (1996) 3 HRNZ 108 (CA). 
6 
Nevertheless, the starting point for the courts is to release information 
unless there are compelling reasons not to. The courts will make orders no wider 
than needed to achieve the desired purpose of a suppression order. 
2 The courts 
will only restrict freedom of expression to the extent necessary to protect some 
countervailing right or interest. 3 
Historically, suppression of information in a proceeding has been 
provided for in the common law and from the inherent jurisdiction of the court. 
In more recent years, Parliament has intervened to legislate when and how name 
suppression is to be applied in particular circumstances, and has extinguished the 
courts inherent jurisdiction in this area.4 
2 Police v O'Connor [1 992] 1 NZLR 87. 
3 Ibid . 
4 R v X (an accused) [1 987] 2 ZLR 240. 
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III THE PRINCIPLE OF OPEN JUSTICE 
" ... justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seen to be done."
5 
A Overview of the Principle 
The principle of open justice ("the principle") reqmres that court 
proceedings be conducted in the open, and accessible to the public and media. 
This also means evidence presented in court can be considered or reported by 
those present. 6 In common law jurisdictions, the origin of the principle can be 
found within the common law itself. In New Zealand today, the principle can be 
found in a number of statutes as well as the common law. 
7
'
8 The principle itself 
has resulted in many rules which generally either ensure proceedings remain 
open, or alternately set the boundary of any restriction of reporting on 
proceedings. Any restriction of reporting in criminal cases is only permissible in 
limited special situations. 
9 As stated in Victim X "[ open justice] is to be applied 
in this particular case, as in all criminal cases, unless compelling reason or 
special circumstances exist." 
10 
One of the first reported cases confirming the importance of the principle, 
is the 1913 House of Lords judgment of Scott v Scott. 
11 That judgment has since 
been confirmed in a long line of cases including Attorney-General v Leveller 
Magazine Ltd.12
 In this later decision, the Court confirmed that hearings should 
5 Rex v. Sussex Justices, Ex pa rte McCarll!JI [1 924] 1 KB 256, Hewart CJ. 
6 T he principle of open justice should no t be confused with the right to freedom of expression. 
\'(!hi.le the two are supportive of each other, their focus remains different. See for exam ple Victim X 
v Television New Zealand Ltd [2003] 3 NZLR 220. 
7 ew Zealand Bill of Rights .-\et 1990, sl 4. 
8 See for example R v Felixstowe [1987] QB 582, 591 Watkins LJ. 
9 See for example T 7ictim X [2003] 3 NZLR 220, Serious Fraud Office v Si11gh (28 .-\ugust 2007) HC .-\K 
CRI-2007-404-219, Courtney J. 
10 Victim Xv Television New Zealand Ltd [2003] 3 ZLR 220. 
11 Scott v Scott [1913] .-\C 417. 
12 Attomry-General v Leveller Magazjm Ltd [1 979] AC 440. 
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be held in an open court, where the public and media are free to hear all 
argument and evidence. In the Leveller case, Lord Diplock states: 
The application of this principle of open justice has two aspects: as respects proceedings 
in the court itself it requires that they should be held in open court to which the press and 
public are admitted and that, in criminal cases at any rate, all evidence communicated to 
the Court is communicated publicly. As respects the publication to a wider public of fair 
and accurate reports of proceedings that have taken place in court the principle requires 
that nothing should be done to discourage this . 
In New Zealand, the principle can be found in section 25 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, which holds that a person charged with an 
offence has the right to a "fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial court." A similar principle can be found in the Sixth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States of America, which provides the accused the 
right to a "speedy and public trial". The principle is now well settled in the New 
Zealand Criminal Law, having been confim1ed in many judgments. 
13 While 
there is some ability for the court to suppress information within a proceeding, 
the extent of the courts ability is heavily limited. The leading New Zealand case 
regarding suppression of information within a proceeding is R v Liddell, where 
Cooke P held that: 
What has to be stressed is that the prima facie presumption as to reporting is always in 
favour of openness ... 
. . .In the present case we are driven to think that the learned Judge, undoubtedly actuated 
by the promptings of humanity, somewhat unde1nted the general public importance of 
open reporting. 14
 
n For example: Broadcasting Corporation of Ne1v Zealand II A-G [1982] 1 ZLR 120 (C\ ), Lewis II W'ilson 
& Horton Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 546, R II Bain (1996) 3 HRNZ 108 (CA). 
11 R II Liddell [1995] 1 NZLR 538 (CA). 
9 
The principle of open justice should not be confused with the right to 
freedom of expression. While the two are supportive of each other, their focus 
remains different. 
15 
B Benefits of Open Proceedings 
There are many benefits for both the judiciary and the public from 
holding proceedings in open court. There could be little doubt the judiciary serve 
an important public function. In order to properly execute that function, it is vital 
the public view the courts as being beyond reproach, and as a result have 
confidence in the justice system. While these considerations are important for 
both the civil and criminal courts, these considerations are particularly important 
in the criminal system given the role of the criminal justice system in the 
functioning of our society. Having the courts open serves to ensure the public 
can see the courts are operating as they should.
16 Lord Steyn expressed the 
importance of the principle as follows: 
17 
A criminal trial is a public event. The principle of open justice puts, as has often been 
said, the judge and all who participate in the trial under intense scrutiny. The glair of 
contemporaneous publicity ensures that trials are properly conducted. It is a valuable 
check on the criminal process. Moreover, the public interest may be as much involved 
in the circumstances of a remarkable acquittal as in a surprising conviction. Infom1ed 
public debate is necessary about all such matters. Full contemporaneous report ing of 
criminal trials in progress promotes public confidence in the administration of justice. It 
promotes the value of the rule of law. 
In Scott v Scott, Lord Atkinson acknowledged that a hearing in public 
may be humiliating and painful for the accused, but that was to be accepted for 
the greater good of society: 
15 Victim Xv Television Neu, Zealand Ltd [2003] 3 NZLR 220. 
16 Broadcasting Corporation of Ne111 Zealand v Attomry-General [1 982] 1 N ZLR 120, 127. 
17 Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions 011 PNblication) [2005] 1 AC 593, 603. 
10 
The hearing of a case in public may be, and often is, no doubt, painful, humiliating, or 
deterrent both to parties and witnesses, and in many cases, especially those of a criminal 
nature, the details may be so indecent as to tend to injury public morals, but all this is 
tolerated and endured, because it is felt that in public trial is to found, on the whole, the 
best security for the pure, impartial, and efficient administration of justice, the best 
means for winning for it public confidence and respect. 
That reasoning was later confirmed by Lord Diplock in Attorney-General 
v Leveller Magazine Ltd: 
18 
As a general rule the English system of administering justice does require that it be done 
in public : Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417. If the way that courts behave cannot be hidden 
from the public ear and eye this provides a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness and 
idiosyncrasy and maintains the public confidence in the administration of justice. 
C Interests of Justice 
A further important consideration, and one which is not always congment 
with an open court, is the consideration of what is in the interests of justice. 
Viscount Haldane in Scott v Scott confirmed the securing of justice is a more 
important requirement than the openness of the courts, and that at times, the 
openness principle must be subservient to the interests of justice: 
19 
.. . While the broad principle is that the Courts of this country must, as between parties, 
administer justice in public, this principle is subject to apparent exceptions, such as 
those to which I have referred. But the exceptions are themselves the outcome of a yet 
more fundamental principle that the chief object of Courts of justice must be to secure 
that justice is done. 
18 Attorney-Genera/ v Le11eller Magazine Ltd (1 979] AC 440. 
19 Scott II S cott (1913] AC 41 7. 
11 
In Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Attorney-General, 
Woodhouse P confirmed the importance of securing justice as expressed in Scott 
v Scott: 20 
.. . [Scott v Scott] demonstrates how jealous the Judges have always been to preserve the 
fundamental principle that justice is to be administered openly and publicly; and that any 
departure from that principle must depend not on judicial discretion but the demands of 
justice itself. 
In the recent Court of Appeal judgement of R v B William Young P, 
Robertson and Baragwanath JJ, confirmed the overriding requirement of any 
decision to suppress information, was to meet the interests of justice:
21 
Here the Judge felt himself bound by the emphatic language of this Court in R v Proctor 
[1997] 1 NZLR 295 , as to the importance of open justice, to deny suppression of the 
appellant's name ... There is need for careful identification of the parties whose interests 
are at stake and the recognition and evaluation of a number of competing factors. 
Among them are the desirability that justice be open, the presumption of innocence, the 
need to maintain confidence in the court, and the overriding requirement that the trial be 
fair. 
Similarly, Justice Fogarty in a recent High Court preliminary judgment, 
confirmed the supremacy the requirement to secure justice, over the general 
principle of open justice. His Honour confirmed that when considering any 
limitation on the open justice principle, the starting point should always be the 
need for open justice as required by section 138 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985, 
unless the statutory exceptions are met, or a departure is required to ensure 
justice is done in a "principled way by exercise of the Court's inherent 
jurisdiction to control the trial".
22 
20 Broadcasting Co,poralion of New Zealand v Attornry-General [1982] 1 ZLR 120, 122. 
21 R v B (C\ 459 /06) [2008] NZCA 130, William Young P, Robertson and Baragwanath JJ. 
22 R v Si/a (6 May 2008) HC Christchurch CRI 2007-009-006120, para 11, Fogarty J. 
12 
The securing of justice, is not only for the benefit of the victim and 
society, but importantly the accused.
23 Section 138(2) of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1985 makes specific reference to the 'interests of justice', as being a 
consideration as to when certain information in a proceeding may be suppressed. 
23 Burrows (ed) Media Law In New Zealand (3 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999). 
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IV LIMITATIONS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF OPEN JUSTICE 
As noted above, the principle of open justice is not absolute. Information 
may in limited circumstances be suppressed. In Leveller, Lord Diplock noted 
that as the purpose of the principle was to serve the needs of justice, there would 
be times when it was necessary to depart from the openness principle, where to 
do otherwise would adversely effect the application of justice. 
24 That approach 
has been endorsed in a number of New Zealand judgments such as Broadcasting 
Corporation of New Zealand v Attorney-General, and Police v O'Connor, where 
Thomas J held "[i]t is therefore axiomatic that the principle of open justice must 
be balanced against the objective of doing justice". 25 
The openness principle in a criminal proceeding will only yield where its 
application would frustrate the interests of justice in that case. Even then any 
departure from the principle will only be permitted to the minimum extent 
necessary.26 Any departure will depend on the circumstances of the individual 
case, and in cases of serious charges, will seldom be granted. Limits exist to the 
form and types of information which must be made available to meet the open 
justice requirement. For example, in R v Mahanga, the court held that the needs 
for open justice were met by having the hearing open to the public. 
27 In that 
case, the court rejected a request for a copy of a video recording of an interview 
with the accused, which had been produced during the trial. 
In any application to depart from the open justice principle, the onus will 
sit with the applicant to demonstrate a departure should be granted.
28 The courts 
have refused to develop set rules for when a request to suppress information will 
be granted. However, the typical factors the courts consider with any application 
include: 
24 Attomry-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd (1 979] AC 440. 
zj Broadcasting C01poratio11 of New Zealand v Attorney-General [1982] 1 NZLR 120, Police v O'Connor [1 992J 
1 NZLR 87. 
26 Broadcasting Co,poratiot1 ef New Zealand v Attornry-General (1982] 1 ZLR 120, 128. 
27 R v Mahanga (2001) 1 ZLR 641. 
28 Victim X (2003) 3 NZLR 220. 
(a) Whether the absence of publicity will cause suspicion to fall on 
others; 
(b) The ability of members of the public, or colleagues, to decide 
whether they wish to retain contact with the accused; 
(c) The likelihood of publicity leading to the discovery of new 
evidence; 
( d) The potential for the accused to re-offend; 
( e) The likelihood of other victims commg forward as a result of 
publication; 
(f) Whether publicity would prejudice the ability of the accused to 
receive a fair trial. 29 
The common law has recognised the extent of any limitation to the 
principle will depend on the stage of the proceeding. For example, sentencing 
must in all cases be given in open court, and no part can take place in 
chambers. 30 However the comis are more willing to grant a suppression order 
prior to a trial. 
A Chambers Hearings 
Given a hearing in chambers is a closed sitting, the effect is to exclude 
the public and media. In criminal proceedings, the extent to which chambers 
hearings can be undertaken are limited as a result of section 138 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1985, which relates to the courts powers to clear the court.
31 This 
section requires that "sittings" of the court which relate to criminal proceedings, 
29 R v Liddell (1 995] 1 ZLR 538 (C\ ). 
30 R v X (an acmsed) (1 987] 2 NZLR 240, Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 546. 
31 .Appendix 1. 
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be unde1taken in open court, with only limited and specific exceptions. 
32 The 
result is that chambers hearings in the criminal jurisdiction will be for merely 
incidental or procedural matters. In Lewis v Wilson and Horton, the Court of 
Appeal was critical that submissions had been received in the District Court in 
chambers, and as such important information had not been disclosed in open 
court. 
B Statutory Limitations to the Principle 
Limitations to the principle can be found in statute and case law. In New 
Zealand, there are a number of automatic statutory restrictions on the publication 
of infom1ation from open court proceedings. In these cases, no order is required 
from the court before the suppression requirement becomes effective. The 
primary criminal provisions allowing for broad suppression of information are 
sections 138 - 140 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985.
33 Any application of these 
provisions must be no wider than necessary to achieve the aim of justice, and the 
order must be explicit and precise.
34 
Other statutory limitations can be found in the following Acts: 
(a) Bail Act 2000, ssl8 - 19 (court may prohibit information 
from bail hearings); 
(b) Crimes Act 1961 , s375A (automatic prohibition of publication 
of information relating to cases of sexual offending); 
(c) Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, s329 
( access to court proceeding where the accused is a youth is 
limited); 
32 See also R v X (an accused) [1 987] 2 ZLR 240, 244. 
33 .t\ ppendix 1. 
34 Police v O'Connor [1 992] 1 NZLR 87. 
( d) Evidence Act 1908, s 15 ( allows for the prohibition of 
questions to be published); 
(e) Summary Proceedings Act 1957, sl85C (restriction of 
publication of complaints and evidence from child 
complainant). 
17 
V OPEN JUSTICE AND THE MEDIA 
The media have a special and crucial role in the operation of an open 
· · 35 Justice system. As held by Justice Frankfurter in Pennekamp v State of 
Florida: 36 
A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent 
judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other, both are indispensable to a 
free society. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary 
through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent 
means for assuring judges their independence is a free press. 
Many judgments have expressed the role of the media as being a 
'surrogate' of the public, given that only limited numbers of people can be 
present in a court sitting. As stated by Cooke P in R v Liddell:
37 
The starting point must always be the importance in a democracy of freedom of speech, 
open judicial proceedings, and the right of the media to report the latter fairly and 
accurately as ' sunogates' of the public. 
A Ability oftlte Media to Appeal Suppression Orders 
Given the important role of the media in the open court, that role has 
developed beyond being a mere witness in a proceeding. The courts have 
confirmed the media have standing to challenging the grant of a suppression 
order, and may seek to have any order discharged, rescinded or varied. In R v L, 
Smellie J stated:38 
Nonetheless it is clear that in New Zealand the media does have standing to apply for 
suppression orders to be discharged, rescinded or varied. That is clear from two Court 
of Appeal decisions, namely Re Wellington Newspapers Ltd's Application [1982] 
15 Police v O'Connor [1992] 1 NZLR 87, R v Felixstowe [1987] QB 582,591. 
16 Pe1111ekamp v Stale of Florida 328 US 331 (1946) 335. 
17 R v Ldde/1 [1995] 1 NZLR 538 (CA). 
38 R v L [1994] 1 NZLR 568, 569. 
18 
NZLR 118 and Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Attorney-General [ 1982] 1 
NZLR 120 ... 
In Lewis v Wilson & Horton, the Court of Appeal confirmed the media 
had standing to bring an application for judicial review. This was on the basis 
that the media was the "watchdog for the public".
39 However, in Fairfax New 
Zealand v C, the Court of Appeal held the media had limited rights to challenge 
interim suppression orders.
40 In that case the Court was not prepared to take a 
liberal interpretation of the law in finding the media organisation to be a "party", 
so as to grant jurisdiction in terms of the Criminal Justice Act 1985. The Court 
confirmed it was open to the media to challenge a decision of the court to grant 
an order only for permanent name suppression. 
B The Courts Ability to Limit Media in Court 
The importance of the media in the open court, is reflected in the 
Criminal Justice Act 1985, which as noted above provides the primary ability to 
suppress information in a criminal proceeding. However, the Act expressly 
limits the ability of the court to exclude accredited news media. Section 138 
gives the court the power to clear the court, and to forbid the reporting of a 
proceeding. However that is limited by section 138(3) which holds: 
The power conferred by paragraph ( c) of subsection (2) of this section shall not, except 
where the interests of security or defence so require, be exercised so as to exclude any 
accredited news media reporter. 
While the author can find no case which has considered what an 
"accredited news media reporter" is, it is clear that the news media have a broad 
39 Le1vis v Wilson & Horton Ltd (2000) 3 NZLR 546. 
4° Faiifax Ne11J Zealand u C (2008) NZCA 39. 
ability as of right to attend full criminal proceedings, a right not held by the 
general public.41 
However the ability of the media to film in court has recently come under 
challenge from Justice Fogarty in an extensively reasoned preliminary decision 
in the case of R v Sila. 42 Justice Fogarty expressed the view that the media's 
ability to film proceedings as allowed for in the Ministry of Justice 'in-court 
media guidelines', went beyond what would be allowable in law.
43 44 His honour 
considered the role of the court was to discharge a public duty which was to 
secure that justice is done accordingly to the law. His Honour held the decision 
to agree to allow filming of a proceeding is not a discretion for the court, rather it 
flows as a consequence of the courts overarching duty to secure justice: 
[The in-court media guidelines] cast the role of the trial judge as exercising a discretion, 
when setting the scope of media coverage of the trial. Rather the Judge is discharging a 
duty to secure that justice be done, according to law, exercisable only on a principled 
basis. That duty includes a duty on the Judge to take positive steps if necessary to 
secure that the evidence is unaffected by media coverage of the trial. .. 
Justice Fogarty distinguished the effects of the media filming and 
photographing a defendant and witnesses, when compared with the effects of a 
reporter being in court and reporting on the evidence and argument observed. 
His Honour held that "I know of no common law authority that has articulated a 
principle that filming and photographing is a simple alternative to observation in 
Court by reporters." In that case Justice Fogarty went on to limit the ability of 
the media to film and photograph the trial, but he did not apply any restrictions to 
general court reporting. In this case at least the court was willing to distinguish 
the form or mode of reporting. 
45 
41 The term "accredited news media reporter" is also found in section 137(1)(g) of the Care of 
Children .-\er 2004, but again is not defined. 
42 R v Si/a (6 J\Iay 2008) HC Christchurch CRI 2007-009-006120, Fogarty J. 
43 Ibid. 
44 In-co11rt media coverage g11idelines, i\Iinistry of Justice, 2003. 
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VI PRIVACY 
Privacy is a developing area of the law in New Zealand. Skegg 
described the concept of privacy as being the ability of a person to permit 
collection and to control sensitive information about them.
46 The right to be free 
from invasion of a persons home, property or person have long been protected 
under both the civil and criminal law. However there has traditionally been no 
general right to protect ones privacy from invasion. More recent times have seen 
the introduction of the Privacy Act 1993, and judicial recognition of the 
emerging tort of privacy in the Judgment of Hosking v Runting.
47 The privacy 
right identified by the Court in Hosking has been applied in a number of other 
judgn1ents. 48 
The courts have recognised that some facts which might be very 
sensitive can become public as a result of the criminal justice system. In 
Television New Zealand Ltd v R, a case relating to suppression orders in the 
'David Bain case', the Court of Appeal observed that "[t]he criminal justice 
system itself requires that some highly offensive facts, once private, do become 
public". 
A Privacy Act 1993 
The Privacy Act 1993 ("Privacy Act") established a range of information 
privacy principles which relate to the, collection, storage, use, retention and 
disclosure of personal information. The Privacy Act also established the Office 
of the Privacy Commissioner. The Act allows for any person to bring a 
complaint to the Privacy Commissioner regarding a proposed breach of the 
principles contained within the Privacy Act. The Privacy Act also allows the 
46 Skegg and Patterson (eds) Medical Law in New Zealand (1" ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2006) 262. 
47 Hosking v &111ti11g [2005] 1 ZLR 1. 
48 See for example, P v D & Independent News Auckland Ltd [2000] 2 ZLR 591 where the tor t was 
used to restrain the release of a persons sensitive mental health info rmation. 
21 
Commissioner to develop specific privacy codes, however no codes have been 
developed which are of direct relevance to the criminal law jurisdiction.49 
B Privacy Protection in New Zealand - Tort of Privacy 
The New Zealand and English courts have diverged in approach with 
issues of privacy. The New Zealand Court of Appeal in Hosking v Runting 
declared it was not prepared to follow the English approach which was to expand 
the boundaries of the law of breach of confidence. The Court in Hosking 
preferring to identify a separate right to privacy. A significant factor for the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal in supporting a separate cause of action for privacy, 
was to reduce confusion with the well established tort of breach of confidence. 
The Court held: 50 
It will be conducive of clearer analysis to recognise breaches of confidence and privacy 
as separate causes of action. 
Privacy and confidence are different concepts. To press every case calling for a remedy 
for unwarranted exposure of information about the private lives of individuals into a 
cause of action have as its foundation trust and confidence would be to confuse those 
concepts. 
In the High Court judgn1ent of P v D, Nicholson J applied the privacy tort 
as recognised in Hosking. 51 In that case, an injunction was granted prohibiting a 
newspaper publication of information relating to public figure who had been 
assisted by the Police during an episode of being mentally unwell. The comi 
determined there was insufficient information to found a breach of confidence, 
however an injunction was allowed on the basis that publication of details of the 
persons medical emergency would result in "unwarranted publication of intimate 
49 See for example, Health Information Privacy Code 1994. 
50 Hosking v &111ti11g [2005] 1 NZLR 1, 45, 48. 
51 P v D & Independent Ne1vs Auckland Ltd [2000] 2 ZLR 591. 
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details of ... private life which were outside the realm of legitimate public 
concern or curiosity."52 Nicholson J accepted that disclosure of events during 
psychiatric care would constitute a considerable intrusion on private facts, 
sufficient to tip the balance against allowing for freedom of expression of the 
media. On that basis the Court found the defence of legitimate public interest 
was not made out. 
C Privacy Protection in the United Kingdom - Breach of Confidence 
Over the last decade, there have been significant developments in the law 
relating to privacy in the United Kindom, primarily due to the effect of the 
European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") which in Article 8 contains a 
right to private and family life, home and correspondence.
53 The ECHR came 
into force in the United Kingdom in 2000. 
The courts in England have declined to develop a privacy tort, preferring to 
develop the cause of action for breach of confidence. 
54 As stated in OBG Ltd v 
Allan "English law knows no common law tort of invasion of privacy"
55 
Traditionally to make out an actionable breach of confidence, the applicant must 
prove the following: 56 
(a) the information had a necessary quality of confidence; 
(b) the information was disclosed m circumstances g1vmg nse to an 
obligation of privacy; 
( c) there was an unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of 
the person originally communicating it. 
52 r\ s stated in Tucker v Neivs Media Oivnership L td (22 October 1986) H C \VN CP 477 / 86, 6 Jeffries. 
53 Co11ue11tio11 for the Protectio11 of H//ma11 Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 10 D ecember 1948, Council of 
E urope, ETS 1 o 005, (entered into force generally on 3 September 1953). 
54 See for example Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22. 
55 OBG Ltd v Allan; Douglas v H ello! Ltd [2007] 2 \VLR 920, [272]. 
56 Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1 969] RPC 41. 
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However, as a result of Campbell v MGN Ltd, the English courts have 
loosened the criteria for making out a breach of confidence.
57 The applicant now 
does not need to show the information was first obtained in circumstances which 
gave rise to a duty of confidence. In the Campbell case, the applicant was well 
known model Naomi Campbell who was photographed leaving an Narcotics 
Anonymous meeting. The publisher was found liable for publishing the 
photographs, despite there being no duty of confidence or breach of a 
confidential relationship between the complainant and the photographer. 
Subsequent judgments have confirmed the approach taken in Campbell, 
but not without some disquiet. For example in Ash v McKennitt, the English 
Court of Appeal recognised that a: 58 
. .. feeling of discomfort arises from the action for breach of confidence being employed 
where there was no pre-existing relationship of confidence between the parties, but the 
'confidence ' arose from the defendant having acquired by unlawful or surreptitious 
means information that he should have known he was not free to use . . . 
1 Defences for Breach of Confidence 
Three primary defences exist in the common law against a claim of a 
breach of confidence. These are: 
(a) consent to the disclosure, or a waiver of any requirement for 
confidentiality; 
(b) a statutory authority for disclosure; 
( c) where public interest outweighs the duty of confidence. 
57 Campbell v MGN Ltd (2004] UKHL 22. 
58 Ash v McKenm/ (2006] EWCA Civ 1714, 80, 86. 
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Bingham LJ in W v England confirmed the law does not consider 
confidentiality "as absolute but as able to be overridden where there is a stronger 
public interest in disclosure."59 To succeed in a public interest defence there 
typically needs to be some imminent harm which would likely result but for the 
disclosure. 60 The circumstances of what would fall within the scope of public 
interest is broad, and includes the administration of justice and public safety. 
Various English stah1tes exist to protect the non-consented release of confidential 
information in specific circumstances.61 
D Other European Privacy Developments 
Recent European cases suggest a willingness to recognise a greater 
interest in personal privacy. In Von Hannover, Princess Caroline sought an 
injunction of the publication of photographs. Those included photographs of 
herself with her children, with a male friend in a restaurant, undertaking sporting 
events, at the beach with her husband, and on holiday. The German Federal 
Comi granted the injunction with regard to the photographs taken in the 
restaurant and the images of the Princess with her children. At appeal, the 
European Court of Human Rights was asked to uphold the request with regard to 
the balance of the photographs. That Court determined the benchmark upon 
which an analysis of article 8 must proceed, and recognised the:
62 
... fundamental importance of protecting private life from the point of view of the 
development of every human being's personality ... extends beyond the private family 
circle and also includes a social dimension ... anyone, even if they are known to the 
general public, must be able to enjoy a ' legitimate expectation ' of protection of and 
respect for their private life. 63 
59 W v England [1 990] 1 1\ll ER 835 (CA) 848. 
60 Smith v Jones (1999) 169 DLR (4th) 385. 
61 In New Zealand see for example the Protected Disclosures Ac t 2000, and rule 11 (2)(d) of the 
Health Information Privacy Code. 
62 Von H annover v Gem1atry [2004] ECHR 294. 
63 Von Hannover v Germa,ry, ibid, 69. 
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The court recognised that "increased vigilance in protecting private life is 
necessary to contend with new communication technologies which make it 
possible to store and reproduce personal data".64 The Von Hannover case was 
notable regarding the courts willingness to protect a persons privacy, even when 
the circumstances of the intrusion (the photographs) was of seemingly ordinary 
every day public conduct. This decision could be contrasted with the English 
Court of Appeal decision in Campbell, where the Court indicated that where the 
conduct photographed was ordinary, there would be no ensuing invasion of 
privacy.65 Similarly, in the English case of Murray v Express Newspapers PLC, 
the Court rejected an action for a proposed breach of privacy where a covert 
photographer had taken photographs of Murray's 18 month old child. 
66 In 
dismissing this case, Patten J held:67 
If a simple walk down the street qualifies for protection then it is difficult to see what 
would not. For most people who are not public figures in the sense of being politicians 
or the like, there will be virtually no aspect of their life which cannot be characterised as 
private. Similarly, even celebrities would be able to confine unauthorised photography 
to the occasions on which they were at a concert, film premiere or some similar 
function. 
However, at appeal, the Court of Appeal took a view more inline with the 
European Court of Human Rights in Von Hannover, in holding that:
68 69 
We do not share the predisposition identified by the judge . . . that routine acts such as a 
visit to a shop or a ride on a bus should not attract any reasonable expectation of privacy. 
All depends on the circumstances. 
6·1 Von H annover v Germa,!Y, ibid, 70. 
65 Campbell v MGN L td [2004] UKHL 22. 
66 The applicant Murray, is the well known author of the 'Harry Potter' series of books, JK Rowling. 
67 Murrqy v Express Newspapers PL C [2007] E\'{IHC 1908, 65. 
68 Von H annover v Germa,ry [2004] ECHR 294. 
69 Murrqy v Big Pictures (UK) L td [2008] E WCA Civ 446, 14. 
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E Privacy Protection in Australia 
Australian courts have in recent years acknowledged an action 1s 
available for an invasion of privacy. In Grosse v Purvis, the Court awarded 
compensatory and exemplary damages for an invasion of privacy. 70 The Court 
expressed the required elements of an action as follows: 
(a) a deliberate act by the respondent; 
(b) the act must intrude on the privacy of the complainant; 
(c) the intrusion must be considered highly offensive to a reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities; 
( d) the intrusion must result in a detriment to the complainant such as 
mental, physiological or emotional harm or distress. 
The Court in Grosse acknowledged a defence of public interest would be 
available against an action for breach of privacy. 
In the 2007 decision of Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation the 
Court considered an action for a breach of confidence, and an invasion of 
privacy. In that case, the defendant media organisation had breached the Judicial 
Proceedings Report Act 1958 (Victoria), which prohibited the publication of 
information which would lead to the identification of a victim of a sexual 
assault. 71 Hampel J upheld the claim of invasion of privacy. That decision was 
appealed, but settled prior to trial. 
70 Grosse v Purois (2003) Aust Torts Reports 81-706. 
1 1 Doe v A11stralia11 Broadcasting Co,poration (2007] VCC 281. 
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F International instruments 
I International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
New Zealand has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights ("ICCPR"). This covenant required that all member states 
introduce legislative and other protections to ensure citizens receive the 
protections ascribed in Article 17, as well as holding a duty to ensure the state 
does not interfere with the Article 17 rights. 72 Article 17 states: 
1. No person shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interferences with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks . 
Article 19(2) of the ICCPR confirms that everyone has the right to 
express and receive information: 
(2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
media of his choice. 
However, sub-article (3) confim1s that such a right can be limited where to do so 
is reasonably necessary to protect the rights or reputation of others: 
(3) The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it 
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but 
these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: 
a) For respect of the rights or reputation of others; 
b) For the protection of national security or of public order ( ordre public) , or of 
public health . 
72 United N ations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No 16: The 
Right lo Respect ef Pn·vary, Fami!J, H ome a11d Correspondence, and Protectio11 ef H onour and Reputation (Art 11) 
(1988) 1. 
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VII PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
Few principles in the criminal law are more fundamental than the 
presumption of innocence. Broadly speaking, this principle holds that a person is 
presumed to be innocent of the offence for which they are charged, until they are 
convicted. This principle is applicable both before a judgment is delivered, and 
following an acquittal or discharge. In the recent Court of Appeal judgment of R 
v Wanhalla [2007] 2 NZLR 573 [ 49], the court reaffirmed the position that a 
criminal trial proceeds from the beginning to the end, with the position that the 
accused is to be treated "as innocent until the Crown has proved his or her guilt". 
An important value in a free society is the ability of citizens to be free 
from unjust invasion of the state. The Law Commission has recognised that 
merely being charged with an offence, invites doubt as to the persons 
innocence: 73 
At the very least the citizen is charged with an offence, usually required to 
attend a court hearing, publicly described as a suspect, and turned into a 
defendant. The defendant may have been finger printed, and detained in a 
cell, possibly overnight, before the court hearing .. .. The very reliability of 
the criminal process invites the public to doubt the innocence of anyone 
brought before the court. Name suppression is exceptional. 
A not uncommon perception within the community is that merely because 
a person has been acquitted of their charge, does not mean to say they are 
innocent. That view is no doubt founded on the high standard required for a 
criminal conviction, of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It would be misguided to 
suggest that all those acquitted of a charge did not in fact have a hand in, or 
actually perpetrated the crime for which they escaped conviction. However it is 
equally misguided to consider that all those acquitted were culpable to any 
73 Compensating the wrongly convicted, report 49, Law Commission, Wellington 1998. 
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degree. The fact remain that the person acquitted is innocent in the eyes of the 
law. As stated by the Canadian Supreme Court in Grdic v R: 74 
... as a matter of fundamental policy in the administration of the criminal law 
it must be accepted by the Crown in a subsequent criminal proceeding that 
an acquittal is the equivalent to a finding of innocence ... to reach behind the 
acquittal, to qualify it, it is, in effect, to introduce the verdict of ' not proven ', 
which is not, has never been and should not l:>e part of our law. 
A number of judgments have confirmed the importance of the 
presumption of innocence in the consideration as name suppression. 75 In R v B, 
the Court of Appeal observed that the presumption of innocence "while often 
determinative in bail cases, in suppression applications this interest has 
sometimes received limited attention."76 In the High Court judgment of J v 
Serious Fraud Office, Baragwanath J allowed a request for suppression on the 
basis that the factors arguing for publication were not sufficient to displace the 
presumption of im1ocence.77 In the recent case of R v Sila , Justice Fogarty held 
the presumption of innocence would succeed over other interests supporting the 
filming or photographing of a defendant during trial. 78 Starting from the position 
of open justice, Justice Fogarty held that the more important duty was to ensure 
that justice is done according to the law. In that case, his Honour held the 
guidelines developed relating to in-court filming and photography were wrong in 
law, in failing to adequately consider important considerations such as justice, 
which included the presumption of innocence. 
74 Grdic v R (1985) 19 D LR (4th) 385, 389-390. 
75 For example, Procter v R [1 997] 1 NZLR 295, M v Police (1991) 8 CRNZ 14, S(1) and S(2) v Police 
(1995) 12 CRNZ 714, R v B (CA 459/06) [2008] NZCA 130, William Young P, Robertson and 
Baragwan ath JJ. 
76 RV B, ibid. 
77 J v Sen·ous Fraud Office (10/0ctober 2001), H C AK A126/01, Baragwanath J. 
78 R v Si/a (6 May 2008) H C Christchurch CRI 2007-009-006120, Fogarty J. 
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A False Complaints 
A proportion of accused persons, will themselves be the victim of a false 
complaint. Due to the very nature of false complaints, the true incidence is 
difficult to determine with accuracy, and will vary depending on the alleged 
offending. One area where there has been significant research on false 
complaints, is with sexual offending. Kanin of Purdue University researched 
confirmed false rape complaints in a small metropolitan community over a 9 year 
period. 79 Of a total of 109 rape complaints, 45 were confirmed to be false ( 41 % ). 
Kanin reports that the falseness of the allegations was not decided by the police, 
or by himself, rather it was "... declared false only because the complainant 
admitted they are false." 
In an extensive report, the Home Office in the United Kingdom 
concluded that 8% of all alleged forcible rapes were determined to be unfounded 
upon investigation. 80 That figure did not include those cases where the alleged 
victim either withdrew the allegation, or subsequently refused to assist police 
with their enquires or prosecution. 
This research suggests a significant rate of false complaints. Given the 
effect on a person accused of a crime, and reported to the public as being 
suspected of committing that crime, the potential for the complaint to be false 
must be given consideration when considering suppression of name. 
79 Dr E ugene J. Kanin "False rape allega tions" (1994) 23 1 Archives of S exua/ Behaviour, 81, 12. 
80 United Kingdom H ome Office Research "A gap or a chasm? A ttrition in reported rape cases" -
February 2005. 
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!IX IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES 
In a criminal process there are broadly two type of penalties an accused 
may face. The primary penalty is that punishment imposed by the court such as 
imprisonment, fines, community work etc. Secondary penalties are those not 
expressly provided for punishment, but which may nevertheless have that result 
as an effect of the accused person. Secondary penalties include effects to a 
person's community standing, employment, family life, psychological distress 
( on the accused and their family) and loss of freedom pending the trial (such as a 
remand in custody, or imposition ofrestrictive bail conditions). While little issue 
could be taken with the role of the courts in imposing a primary penalty upon 
conviction, the question which must be considered is the extent to which society 
considers tolerable a secondary penalty. In R v Sila , Justice Fogherty considered 
that question and determined there is no basis for the court to impose any 
punishment on the accused prior to his or her conviction, which would result 
from publication of name, as they are to be considered innocent until any later 
conviction.81 While that dictum was in relation to a request for filming and 
photography of the accused, his Honour nevertheless held: 82 
Because of the presumption of innocence, I am of the view that as a matter of principle 
the publicity adverse to the accused should be limited, as a precaution, to avoid 
imposing an unjust punishment. Elsewhere, in the United Kingdom by law, and in 
Canada and Australia, such filming and photography does not happen. 
His Honour further stated that: 
.. .I must ensme that I do not impose a punishment on an accused person prior to 
conviction. I consider that the filming of an accused person in a Courtroom in the dock, 
or its equivalent can be a public humiliation. The accused person has a right to oppose it 
while presumed innocent, and he has done so here. To secure that justice be done it is 
prudent to prevent possible humiliation by such filming. 
8 1 R v Si/a (6 i\Iay 2008) H C Christchw:ch CRI 2007-009-006120, 19 Fogarty J. 
82 R v Si/a, Ibid, 27. 
32 
The courts have recognised in other judgments that publication of a 
persons name prior to conviction has a punitive effect on a person who must be 
considered innocent. For example, in M v Police, Fisher J held: 83 
One must recognise a crucial difference between the approach which is appropriate 
where the defendant is merely charged with an offence, and the approach where he or 
she has been convicted. Publication of name is frequently a major and appropriate 
element of an offenders punishment once it is established that he or she is guilty. But 
punitive considerations are obviously irrelevant before conviction. At that stage the 
defendant is entitled to the presumption of innocence. Yet the stigma associated with a 
serious allegation will rarely be erased by a subsequent acquittal. Consequently, when a 
Court allows publicity which will have serious adverse consequences for an unconvicted 
defendant, it must do so in the knowledge that it is penalising a potentially innocent 
person. That is far from saying that suppression should always be granted before guilt is 
established. But in my view the presumption of innocence and risk of substantial harm 
to an innocent person should be expressly articulated in these cases to avoid the danger 
that they will be overlooked. 
83 M v Police (1991) 8 CRN Z 1 +, see also S (1) and S (2) v Police (1995) 12 CRNZ 714. 
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IX INTERESTS OF THE VICTIM AND PUBLIC 
When discussing the issue of suppression of information in a criminal 
proceeding, consideration must also be made toward the interests of the victim 
and public. 
A Interests of the Victim 
Over the years, the processes and policies underpinning the criminal law 
has developed with increasing recognition of the interests of the victim.84 The 
issue of name suppression of the accused is no different. The common law has 
developed (as discussed further below) to take into account the views of the 
victim when considering whether to grant an application for name suppression. 
The interests of victims is further recognised in statute. For example, section 138 
of the CJA provides for automatic suppression of the name of the accused, and 
the victim in cases of sexual offending. In R v W, the Court of Appeal 
recognised that provision is entirely to protect the victims of sexual offending, as 
opposed to the accused. 85 
A difficulty arises in any discussion of name suppress10n, in that it is 
impossible to say generally what the position is of victims in the wider sense. 
For example, some victims prefer to have the name of the accused suppressed if 
there is a risk of their own identification, whereas some are satisfied for 
publication to occur. There appear to be wide ranging reasons for a victim to 
seek such publication. 
84 During the hearing, it may be in issue whether the alleged 'victim' is in fact a 'victin1'. In such 
cases the judgment will have the effect of making a finding of fact that the person is the victim in the 
alleged criminal conduct. Technically, prior to judgment it would be correct to refer to the 'victim' as 
the "alleged victim". However, for brevity, I will use to term 'victim' to refer to both 'alleged' and 
'confirmed' victims. 
ss R v W (1998] 1 NZLR 35. 
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As discussed further below, section 140( 4A) of the CJA reqmres the 
Court to consider the views of any victim, or the parent or guardian of a victim, 
when considering a request for permanent name suppression. 
B Interests of the Public 
One of the common arguments favouring publication of an accused name, 
is that such publication is in the public interest. This may include giving the 
public knowledge of who in the community is potentially a risk, so as to provide 
the ability to avoid such people. 
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X RELEVANT STATUTES 
A Criminal Justice Act 1985 
The primary legislation dealing with the suppression of information in a 
criminal proceeding, is the Criminal Justice Act 1985 ("CJA"). 86 Prior to the 
introduction of the CJA, the courts had a more limited ability to suppress 
information under the Criminal Justice Act 1954, but did have the ability to 
suppress infomrntion under its inherent powers. 87 However, section 138(5) had 
the effect of codifying the law regarding suppression of information, and 
extinguishing any inherent powers previously exercised by the court. Section 
138(5) holds: 
The powers conferred by this section to make orders of any kind described in subsection 
(2) of this section are in substitution for any such powers that a court may have and 
under any inherent jurisdiction or any rule of law; and no court shall have power to 
make any order of any such kind except in accordance with this section or any other 
enactment. 
I Section I 38 
Section 138 is entitled "power to clear court and forbid report of 
proceedings". Subsection 1 confirms the common law principle of openness of 
justice stating that: 
Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of any other 
enactment, every sitting of any court dealing with any proceedings in respect of an 
offence shall be open to the public. 
Subsection 2 provides for the suppression of infomrntion in stated types of 
cases, at the discretion of the court, where the court considers the effect on the 
86 r\ppendi.x 1. 
87 T qylor v Attorney-General (1975] 2 NZLR 675. 
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victim would effect their reputation, or be in the interest of justice or public 
morality to do so. Those types of cases include alleged sexual offending or 
extortion. This provision includes the ability to: 
(a) forbid publication of any report or account or any part of the 
evidence adduced, or of the submissions made; 
(b) make an order forbidding the publication of name of any witness, 
or witnesses, or any name or particulars likely to lead to the 
identification of the witness( s ); 
( c) exclude persons from the hearings (not including the informant, 
police, the defendant, counsel engaged in the proceeding and 
officers of the court (with some limitations)). 
However, subsection 3 holds that the subsection 2 exclusions should not 
be applied to exclude accredited news media, except in cases involving the 
security and defence of New Zealand. 
Penalties for a breach of section 138 are set out at subsections 7 and 8, to 
include a fine not exceeding $1,000, or the penalty applied for a contempt of 
court for any evasion or attempted evasion of section 138(2)(c) (which relates to 
an exclusion of persons from a proceeding). 
2 Section I 39 
Section 139 is entitled "prohibition against publication of names in 
specified sexual cases". 88 This provision provides for an automatic prohibition 
against publication of names in specified sexual cases. Importantly, there is no 
need for any application to be made to the court for a suppression to become 
88 See appendix 1. 
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automatically effective.89. As noted in subsection lAA, the purpose of section 
139 is to protect persons upon whom an offence has been or is alleged to have 
been committed. The primary provision is subsection 1, which holds: 
No person shall publish, in any report or account relating to any proceeding commenced 
in any court in respect ofan offence against any of sections 128 to 142A of the Crimes 
Act 1961 , [ or in respect of an offence against section 144A of that Act,] the name of any 
person upon or with whom the offence has been or is alleged to have been committed, or 
any name or particulars likely to lead to the identification of that person, unless -
(a) That person is of or over the age of 16 years; and 
(b) The court, by order, permits such publication 
In terms of 'publication of the name of the offender', that means an 
automatic prohibition on publication where publication would "likely to lead to 
the identification" of the victim or alleged victim. While the standard of 
"likely", is subjective, the courts have confirmed that is made out where there is 
an appreciable risk that publication might lead to the identification of the 
victim.90 The courts have confirmed that ifthere is any doubt as to the likelihood 
of identification, the courts should make an order under section 139.91 In A v 
Hunt, the High Court indicated the bar was not set particularly high, and would 
include publication about details which would provide information to enable 
aspects of their identity to be disclosed. 92 As confirmed by Cooke P in R v 
Liddell:93 
We stress that by the automatic operation of the ban enacted by Parliament [ section 
139(2)] , and not by any order of the Court, the media are not free to report the 
appellant's name or any other particulars if the report would be likely to lead to the 
identification ofa victim. Compare Ex p Godwin [1992] QB 190; [1991] 3 All ER 81 8; 
and contrast s 139A(2) of the New Zealand Act. We draw attention to this as the media 
will have to take it into account in preparing any repmi. 
89 R v W [1 998] 1 NZLR 35. 
90 R V W, ibid . 
9 1 Procter v R (1 997] 1 NZLR 295, R v 111/'; ibid . 
92 A v H unt (17 May 2006) HC WN CIV-2003-485-2553, Wild J 
93 R v Liddell (1995] 1 NZLR 538 (CA) . 
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Subsection 2 provides an express prohibition against publication of the 
name of the offender or alleged offender if the charge is brought under sections 
130 and 131 of the Crimes Act 1961 , being incest or sexual conduct with a 
dependent family member, if publication is likely to lead to the accused 
identification. 
3 Section 140 
Section 140 of the CJA is entitled "court may prohibit publication of 
names", and as suggested in its title, expressly provides for the prohibition of 
publication of names in general. 94 This provision provides wide scope for the 
court to prohibit the names of any person accused or convicted of a crime or 
connected to a proceeding. This includes not only the persons name, but their 
occupation and address, and any particulars likely to lead to their identification. 
Subsection 2 allows the court to expressly provide name suppression for a 
limited time, or on a permanent basis if the court does not set any time limit. 
Subsection 3 recognises that often a suppression order will be granted 
pending an appeal on the courts decision not to grant a suppression application. 
This provision holds that the suppression order will automatically cease on 
determination of the appeal, or on the expiry on the time frame allowed to seek 
an appeal. 
Subsection 4 holds that the court may grant a further application for name 
suppression, at the expiry of the previous order. Subsection 4A was inserted in 
2002 as a result of s53 of the Victims Rights Act 2002. This new provision holds 
that when the Court is considering a request for permanent name suppression, 
that consideration must be had for the views of the victim, or the parent or 
guardian of the victim, conveyed in accordance with s28 of the Victims' Rights 
Act 2002. 
94 R v Liddell [1 995] 1 NZLR 538 (CA). 
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B New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
1 Section 14 
Section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 relates to freedom 
of expression, and holds: 
14 Freedom of expression 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, 
and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form. 
In Lewis v Wilson & Horton, Elias CJ confirmed that a judge must 
consider whether any request to grant a request for suppression, would be a 
reasonable limitation on the sl4 right to freedom of expression: 95 
The Judge must identify and weigh the interests, public and private, which are relevant 
in the particular case. It will be necessary to confront the principle of open justice and 
on what basis it should yield. And since the Judge is required by s 3 to apply the ew 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, it will be necessary for the Judge to consider whether 
in the circumstances the order prohibiting publication under s 140 is a reasonable 
limitation upon the s 14 right to receive and impart information such as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society (the test provided for in s 5). 
Given the congruence of these important considerations, the balance must come down 
clearly in favour of suppression if the prirna facie presumption in favour of open 
reporting is to be overcome. 
2 Section 25 
Section 25 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 holds that a 
person charged with an offence has the right to be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty according to the law, and has the right to a "fair and public hearing 
95 Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd [2000] 3 ZLR 546. 
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by an independent and impartial court. "96 Some commentators have opined that 
this section can be interpreted by using the words "and public hearing", to 
support that proceedings must be open. For example, Burrows states: 97 
In the first place, the hearing must take place in open court, and members of the public 
(including reporters) are entitled as of right to be present. The New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 reaffirms this principle; it provides that a person charged with an 
offence has a right to ' a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial court. 
In the author's opinion, it is not correct to say that section 25 requires the 
proceeding to be held in the open. Section 25 is a provision centred on the 
protection of the accused. Typically personal rights are not mandatory for the 
person, and so the person can if they so chose elect not to avail themselves of any 
right available. 98 For example, section 23(4) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 holds that "[e]veryone who is ... arrested ... or detained ... shall have the 
right to refrain from making any statement. .. ". Accordingly, any person arrested 
or detained may should they wish, avail themselves of the right to refrain from 
making a statement to Police. However they could equally decline the benefit of 
such a right, and decide to make a statement. In the context of section 25, the 
accused could, in theory at least, elect not to have a 'public hearing' as would 
otherwise be required as the result of section 25. 
96 A similar provision is found in the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
("ICCPR") and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 14(1) of the ICCPR states "In 
the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at 
law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and 
impa1iial tribunal established by law. " 
97Burrows (ed) Media Law Jn New Zealand (4th ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland) 1999. 
98 Johnson v Morton [1980] AC37. 
XI APPLICATIONS FOR THE GRANT AND REVOCATION OF NAME 
SUPPRESSION 
The starting point in any application for name suppression is always the 
importance of freedom of expression and the principle of open justice.99 In the 
leadingjudgment of A-G v Leveller Magazine Ltd, Lord Diplock stated that: 100 
The application of this principle of open justice has two aspects: as respects proceedings 
in the court itself it requires that they should be held in open court to which the press and 
public are admitted and that, in criminal cases at any rate, all evidence communicated to 
the court is communicated publicly. As respects the publication to a wider public of fa ir 
and accurate reports of proceedings that have taken place in court the principle requires 
that nothing should be done to discourage this . 
A Time for Application 
An application for suppression of name may be made either prior to or 
during a hearing. In the case of Kingi v Police, an application for suppression 
was granted prior to the preliminary hearing, which had the effect of being made 
outside of an open court proceeding. 101 
B Automatic Suppression in Certain Cases 
As noted above, section 139 of the CJA and section 375A of the Crimes 
Act 1961 provide for automatic name suppression in certain specified cases of 
sexual offending. In such cases, no application needs to be made to the court 
before an effective suppression would exist. 
99 R vLddel/ [1 995] 1 NZLR 538, 546-547, Rv B (CA 459/06) [2008] ZCA 130, William Young 
P, Robertson and Baragwana th JJ. 
100 Attorney - General v Leveller Magazjne Ltd [1 979] AC 440, 450. 
101 Kingi v Police (6 D ecember 2002), H C Rotorua i 1.P 99 /02, Nicholson J. 
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C Revoking Name Suppression at the Request of the Victim 
Section 139 holds that an alleged victim may apply to the court for an 
order that either their name (ss lA), or the name of the offender (ss 2A) be 
published, and that the court must make such an order, providing the court is 
satisfied that the applicant understands the nature and effect of their request. 
Such a request must be fonnally made to the court, given the potential for 
damage to the victim(s) of the offending. The Court will almost certainly require 
evidence to demonstrate the applicant fully understands the consequences of the 
application. 102 
There is the issue of whether a person who is the subject of a suppression 
order, could consent directly to the media to allow the publication of the persons 
name. There is a general rnle that a person may waive a statutory protection, 
passed to protect people in the category of persons concerned. 103 However, as 
noted in Burrows and Cheer, the media may be unable to avail themselves of 
protection where the publication is of automatically suppressed names in a 
criminal case, as consent is seldom a defence to a criminal charge, as would be 
the case for a breach of a suppression order. 104 
102 XII Police (12 J\Iay 2006), HC .r\K CRI-2005-404-430, Harrison J, lf:1/aikato and King Country Press 
Ltd II R (1 997] D CR 292. 
103 Johnson 11Morton (1 980] r\ C37. 
104 Burrows ( ed) M edia La}/) In New Zealand ( 4th ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999) 242. 
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XII CONSIDERATIONS MADE BY THE COURT WHEN 
CONSIDERING NAME SUPPRESSION 
It is a well settled law, that save for certain specific exceptions, criminal 
proceedings in a New Zealand court will be open to the public. Certainly that is 
the starting point for any consideration of suppression of information. 1 os With an 
application for name suppression, the onus sits with the applicant to show that 
the court should allow a departure away from the principle of open justice. 106 A 
review of New Zealand judgments demonstrates that the courts have consistently 
refused to define set criteria which must exist in order to receive name 
suppression. For example, in R v Liddell, the court held it would be 
"inappropriate for this Court to lay down any fettering code." 107 
With any application for name suppression, the courts will balance the 
principle of open justice with the interests of justice in that particular case. The 
result will often be a tension between the ability of the media to freely report on a 
proceeding and the public's ability to receive that information, against the 
accused's right to a fair trial. Where any appreciable risk to a fair trial exists, the 
courts will typically grant a suppression order. 108 
In R v Liddell, Cooke P confirmed that the grant of an application for 
name suppression is a discretionary matter for the Court, and one which should 
not be lightly disturbed. The President states: 
.. .It has to be remembered also that he was exercising a discretionary jurisdiction. 
Although he took comfort in the knowledge that his decisions could be reviewed on 
appeal, this Court does not disturb such decisions unless they are based on some wrong 
principle or otherwise shown sufficiently clearly to be wrong. 
105 Sen·ous Fraud Office v Singh (28 August 2007) , HC Auckland CRI-2007-404-219, Courtney J , Victim 
Xv Television Ne1JJ Zealand Ltd (2003] 3 NZLR 220, R v B (CA 4 59 / 06) [2008} NZCA 130 William 
Young P, &bertson and Baragivanath ]]. 
106 Victim X, ibid. 
101 R v Liddell [1995] 1 TZLR 538 (C\). See also March v Police (12 July 1979) SC apier 11 30/79. 
108 R v B, ibid, Solicitor-General v Wellington NeJ1Jspapers Ltd (1995] 1 NZLR 45, Gisborne Herald Co Ltd v 
Solicitor- Genera/ [1995] 3 NZLR 563. 
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While the Court will consider the opinion of the police when considering 
a request for name suppression, the opinion of the police will not be a 
precondition to the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court.109 Where an 
application for suppression of information in the interests of justice is made, the 
applicant must show it is likely the administration of justice would be effected 
through the publication of the information, or openness of the court proceeding. 
An example would be where there is a realistic likelihood the prospects of a fair 
trial would be affected if information such as the name of the accused was 
published. 
A Onus of Proof 
Where any application for name suppression is made, the onus to prove it 
should be granted sits with the applicant to make their case "strictly and bring it 
up to the standard which the underlying principle requires" .110 Befitting the 
criminal standard of proof, the courts have confirmed that the onus on the 
applicant is "a heavy one".111 
B Factors the Court Consider 
While the courts have declined to set any criteria for granting of name 
suppression, the following factors are typically considered by the court. 
1 Stage of proceeding 
An important factor the court will consider is the stage of the proceeding. 
This factor was discussed at length in R v B.112 The Court of Appeal confirmed 
that the bar is not set high in order to obtain a grant of name suppression prior to 
a trial. The Court held that "Pre-trial publicity may be ill-infonned and perhaps 
109 Lewis v IIVi/son & Horton Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 546. 
110 R v Paterson (1 992] 1 ZLR 45. 
111 Police v O'Connor [1 992] 1 TZLR 87. 
112 
R v B (CA 459 / 06) [2008] NZC.A 130 William Young P, Robertson and Baragwanath JJ. 
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unjustified ... There is the natural justice consideration that the accused has not 
had an opportunity to present the defence case." By the time the case gets to 
trial, "suppression ... is uncommon because the accused has the opportunity to 
place the defence contentions before the court and therefore those present in 
court or who read reports of the proceedings". Following trial, it would be" ... 
rare for suppression to be ordered save in cases where that is required to protect a 
person other than the person convicted." Similarly, the Law Commission in 
their publication Delivering Justice for all, held that the considerations for name 
suppression were dependent on the stage of the proceeding. 11 3 The Commission 
proposed there should be a general prohibition on publication of name until the 
substance of a charge is heard before the court. 
2 Seriousness of the charges 
The courts have recognised that when the charges are truly minor, even 
when the person is convicted, that there is a stronger justification for a departure 
from the open justice principle. This is particularly where the potential harm to 
the accused from publication of name will outweigh any public interest in 
publication. 114 As stated by Cooke Pin R v Liddell: 115 
. .. a case of acquittal, or even conviction of a truly trivial charge, where the damage 
caused to the accused by publicity would plainly outweigh any genuine public interest, 
is an instance when, depending on all the circumstances, the jurisdiction could properly 
be exercised ... 
The courts have held that defendants in sexual offending cases are 
unlikely to be granted name suppression (save for the statutory prohibitions). 116 
113 New Zealand Law Commission Delivering]mtice For All.· A Vision for New Zealand Courts and 
Tribunals - NZLC R 85 i\Iarch 2004. 
114 M v Police (1991) 8 CRNZ 14, Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 546, R v S (21 
lovember 1985), CA 116/ 85. 
115 R v Ldde/1 [1995] 1 NZLR 538 (CA). 
116 Procter v R [1997] 1 NZLR 295. 
3 Previous convictions and acceptance of wrong doing 
The lack of previous convictions and acknowledgement of wrongdoing 
will not necessarily be an important factor in deciding whether to grant 
suppression. These circumstances are described as "commonplace factors" .117 
4 Driving While Intoxicated 
There is a statutory prohibition of suppression of names for drink driving 
offences, except in extraordinary situations. 11 8 
5 Acquittal or discharge 
There is no automatic presumption in favour of name suppression when 
the accused is acquitted, however the fact of an acquittal will significantly argue 
for an ultimate suppression of name. 11 9 However, even following acquittal, the 
courts have recognised there may still be a legitimate interest in the public to 
know the name of the acquitted person. 120 In Lewis v Wilson & Horton , the 
Court of Appeal upheld the High Courts decision which allowed for the 
publication of the accused name following a discharge without conviction, after a 
guilty plea. The charge in that case related to importing drugs (cannabis plant 
and resin). 121 
In R v H, Baragwanath J granted name suppress10n where the court 
detern1ined that on the evidence the accused had no charge to answer. The Court 
was satisfied it would not be acceptable that a person who received a judgn1ent 
under s34 7 of the Crimes Act 1961 (power to discharge an accused), should then 
117 Lewis II Wilson & H orton Ltd [2000] 3 ZLR 546. 
118 Land T rans port 1\ ct 1962, s61 . 
119 R II Liddell [1 995) 1 ZLR 538 (CA). 
120 R II Dalzell (1991) 63 CCC (3d) 13-1-, R v Liddell [1 995) 1 ZLR 538 (CA). 
121 Le111is 11 117ilson and H orton, ibid. 
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also be faced with negative inference which might be reached of the accused, 
given the charge was of serious sexual offending. 
6 Age of the accused 
The age of the accused will be an important factor when considering an 
application for name suppression. In TV 3 v R, the accused was 15 year of age at 
trial, and 14 years at the time of the offending, Justice Winkelmann observed, 
referring to his earlier oral decision: 122 
I referred in detail to certain international instruments such as the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child which imposed upon the state obligations to respect the privacy and 
dignity of the child and also to promote the child 's reintegration and rehabilitation. 
Having weighed those matters, and having heard the evidence of Dr Immelman, 
I.. . [granted name suppression] at least prior to the verdict, to preserve the potential for 
rehabilitation and reintegration. 
Article 8 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
administration of Juvenile Justice ("the Beijing Rules"), hold: 
8 Protection of Privacy 
8.1 The juvenile 's right to privacy shall be respected at all stages in order 
to avoid harm being caused to her or him by undue publicity or by the 
process of labelling. 
8.2 In principle, no information that may lead to the identification of a 
juvenile offender should be published. 
Furthermore, Article 40 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child provides that states parties shall ensure that every child alleged or 
accused of infringing the penal law should have minimum guarantees, including 
122 TVJ v R (7 July 2006) HC AK CRI 2005-92-14652, 6. 
the right "to have his or her pnvacy fully respected at all stages of the 
proceedings". 
For any proceeding in the Youth Court, there is an automatic prohibition 
against publication of name as a result of section 438 of the Children, Young 
Persons, and Their Families Act 1989. However, that prohibition does not apply 
if the young person is committed for trial in the District or High Court. 123 In 
such cases, the accused will need to apply for name suppression in the same 
manner as would an adult accused. 
7 Impact on the accused 
When considering a request for name suppress10n, the courts will 
consider the impact of publication on the accused, although this consideration 
has significant limitations. Generally, this consideration will be limited to cases 
where: 
(1) publication would potentially affect the ability of the accused to 
receive a fair trial, and extents to situations where publication would 
limit the ability of the accused to defend themselves; 124 
(2) result in a real risk the accused will self harm prior to the trial; 
(3) significantly affect the physical or mental health of the accused. 
The standard required to show a risk must be more than a 
possibility. In Jacks v Hastings District Court, the court stated the 
potential effect must be "exceptional"; 125 
( 4) where the effects to the accused will be out of all proportion to the 
seriousness of the offending, which might include factors such as 
123 R II Hansen (20 March 2006), CA24/ 86. 
124 R II UV (110 2) (2004) 21 CRNZ 937 (CA). 
125 Jacks v Hastings District Court [2005] NZAR 736 (CA). 
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effect upon financial and professional interests. The effect must be 
sufficient to displace the presumption favouring publication; 126 
(5) publication would materially reduce the effects of rehabilitation. 127 
In R v B, the Court of Appeal held that human dignity of the accused was 
a factor to be considered: 128 
An overlapping public interest, referred to in Proctor, is that of human dignity, which 
has emerged as a fundamental human right and is increasingly protected by the evolving 
right to privacy. This latter has been recognised by Parliament in the Privacy Act 1993 
and by this court as an emerging tort: Hosking v Runting ... 
In R v Si/a, Justice Fogherty recognised there is the potential for adverse 
effects on the accused if acquitted, merely by publication of photographs or film 
images of the them: 129 
... there is a basis in this case for Mr Cook's argument that if Mr Sila become 
recognisable by reason of his picture being broadcast or published he may, if acquitted, 
nonetheless be the subject of attacks on his person because of the context of tragedy 
which surrOLmds this case. 
8 Impact on the accused's family 
The courts generally place little weight on the effect to the accused family 
when considering a request for suppression. In W v Police, the court held there 
was always significant effects on an accused' family when the charges relate to 
serious offending. For that reason, the court held the effect of the family was of 
126 LeJ1Jis v lVilso11 & Horton Ltd [2000] 3 ZLR 546 
121 R v B (21 April 2005) CA4/ 05. 
128 R v B (CA 459 / 06) [2008] NZC-\ 130, William Yow1g P, Robertson and Baragwanath JJ. 
129 R v Si/a (6 l\Iay 2008) HC Christchurch CRI 2007-009-006120, 30 Fogarty J. 
little moment when considering an individual application for suppression. 130 
Similarly in the earlier case of R v Liddell, the court held that "when a conviction 
is for serious crime it can only be very rarely that the interests of the offenders 
family will justify an order suppressing disclosure of his identity" .131 However, 
that Court nevertheless maintained a prohibition on publication of the name, 
address and occupation of Mr Liddell's wife and sons. The Court state: 
Publication of the accused 's identity will necessarily lead some members of the public to 
identify also his wife and sons. We see no reason, however, why these innocent 
persons, although they are 'connected with the proceedings' as the Judge held, should 
not receive such protection as the statute enables. 
However, in some other cases, the courts have allowed suppression of 
name when satisfied the effect on family members justified a depariure from the 
principle of open justice. 132 
9 Impact on employer 
Generally the courts have been receptive toward considering the effect of 
publication of an accused name on an employer. 133 In R v Ka the court granted 
an application of suppression to a medical doctor charged with sexual offending, 
on the basis that publication would umeasonably affect the medical centre where 
the he worked as a locum. 134 The court accepted that publication would affect 
the confidence of patients who attended that medical centre. 
The Court must be provided with evidence to show a likely harm to the 
employer, in order for the interests of the employer to be sufficient to displace 
the presumption on freedom ofreporting. 135 
130 lf:1/' v Police [1 997] 2 NZLR 17. 
131 R v Liddell [1 995] 1 ZLR 538 (Cr\ ). 
132 S (!) and S (2) v Police (1995) 12 CR.NZ 714. 
rn T v Police (29 ovember 1991) HC AK .\P282/ 91, Tompkins J 
131 R v Ka (24 February 1999) H C AK T990076, Smellie J. 
135 Le1v1s v lf:1/'ilso11 & IIorton Ltd [20001 3 NZLR 546. 
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10 Impact on other accused 
The courts will typically grant suppression where the publication of an 
offenders name will potentially jeopardise the ability to conduct a fair trial for 
co-accused. 
11 Providing information to the police 
In cases where an accused has provided information to the police which 
may result in conviction or investigation of others, provision of name 
suppression may be required to ensure the safety of the accused. 136 
12 Likelihood of other victims coming forward 
A commonly stated reason for restricting suppress10n of name, is that 
naming the offender may result in other victims coming forward . In R v Liddell, 
the Court of Appeal noted the prisoner was a proved paedophile. 137 The Court 
was not satisfied the High Court had applied the appropriate considerations with 
regard to encouraging other victims to come forward. The High Court Judge held 
he could not "properly and fairly take that speculative possibility into account 
against Mr Lon this occasion." In the Court of Appeal, Cooke P stated: 
In the case of a proved paedophile, and especially one with two proved periods of 
offending, the risk that further offending may have occurred is regrettably more than an 
insignificant possibility. In this case there are factors which underline the risk. While it 
would be wholly wrong to assume further offending, it cannot be overlooked that the 
accused held a series of posts bringing him close to young people ... 
.. . The Deputy Solicitor-General informed the Court that two further alleged victims had 
come forward as a result o pi1l:>lic ·ty; there complaints were being investigated by the 
police. 
136 Broadcasting Corporation of NZ 11A-G [1 982] 1 NZLR 120. 
137 R II Liddell [1 995] 1 ZLR 538 (CA). 
13 Futility of order 
The courts have been reluctant to refuse an application merely on the 
proposed futility of granting a suppression order, on the basis that the 
info1mation may be published either within New Zealand or internationally. 138 
However, where the information is already in the public domain, "it will not 
generally be appropriate to grant name suppression". 139 
14 Community standing, celebrities or professionals 
The courts will place little weight on the position or celebrity of a person 
within the community, when considering requests for name suppression. This 
category of accused still needs to show that the effect of publication is likely to 
extend beyond what is reasonable in such cases. In Abbott v Wallace, a case 
involving a Police officer charged privately with murder, and A Defendant v 
Police, a prosecution of a District Court Judge charged with sexual offending, the 
courts declined to grant suppression. 140 
When considering whether to grant suppression, the courts will generally 
not grant the application where the effect of suppression would be an ordinary 
consequence of the offending. In the Court of Appeal decision of Proctor v R, 
the court declined a request for name suppression from a surgeon. The Court 
stated that "one must be careful to avoid creating a special echelon of privileged 
persons in the community who will enjoy suppression where there less fortunate 
compatriots would not". 141 In Lewis v Wilson & Horton, the court held: 142 
138 Lewis v Wilson & Horton L td [2000] 3 NZLR 546 
139 Le1vis v Wilson & Horton Ltd, ibid, A-G for UK v Wellington Newspapers Ltd [1 988] 1 NZLR 129 (CA). 
See also Tucker v Ne1vs Media Ownership Ltd [1 986] 2 NZLR 716. 
140 Abbott v IVallace [2002] NZAR 95, '.A Defendant' v Police (1997) 14 CRNZ 579. 
14 1 Proctor v R [1 997] 1 NZLR 295 (CA) . 
142 Lewis v lf7ilson & Horton L td [2000] 3 NZLR 546. 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
53 
The standing of the appellant as 'an extraordinarily successful businessman, community 
leader and philanthropist' was not grounds for suppressing his name in the absence of 
evidence of special harm to him through publicity. No harm to the appellant was 
suggested beyond the submission that his standing would make media interest in him 
'undue'. That is tantamount to a submission that successful or prominent members of 
the community should receive name suppression because there may be media interest in 
such people . . .In the absence of identified harm from publicity which clearly extends 
beyond what is normal in such cases, the presumption of public entitlement to the 
information prevails. Any other approach risks creating a privilege for those who are 
prominent which is not available to others in the community and imposing censorship on 
information according to the Court's perception of its value. 
C Interim and Permanent Orders 
It is open for the court to grant either interim or permanent name 
suppress10n. Interim orders are typically granted by the court until the applicant 
enters a plea, or until the conclusion of a preliminary hearing or the conclusion of 
the trial. It is uncommon for the court to award permanent name suppression 
prior to the conclusion of a proceeding. 
It is common for the court to consider applications differently depending 
on the phase of the proceeding. For example, in TV3 v R the court declined an 
application from TV3 to lift name suppression from the accused in a pre-trial 
application, but invited the media to further apply at the conclusion of the 
hearing. 143 In cases where the court grants an application for name suppression, 
the order will be permanent unless the court expressly states the order was an 
interim one. 144 
In cases where a registrar adjourns a hearing, the accused can request a 
grant of name suppression from the registrar. Any grant is always interim for a 
14-
maximum of 28 days. ) However, a registrar may grant an application for 
permanent name suppression in cases where a Police diversion has been 
1·13 TV3 v R (7 July 2006) HC _'\K CRI 2005-92-14652, 3. 
144 l 'ictim Xv T VNZ Ltd (2003) 20 CRNZ 194. 
1·15 Stm1.rnary Proceedings Act 1957, s46(2) and (3). 
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completed, and the informant seeks the leave of the court to withdraw the 
charge. 146 
146 Summary Proceedings Act 1957, s36(1A) and (1B). 
55 
XIII BREACHES OF SUPPRESION ORDERS 
It is an offence to publish any suppressed information within an order 
from the court, or from the effect of automatic name suppression. It is also an 
offence to evade or attempt to evade a suppression order on publication. In order 
to breach a suppression order, there must be a public disclosure of the suppressed 
material. 147 It is permissible for the media to breach a suppression order, when 
the media have been requested by the Police to publish the name or identifying 
particulars of a person who is the subject of a suppression order, when that 
person has escaped from custody, and the purpose of the publication is to attempt 
to recapture that person. 148 In such a case, the media does not require the 
authority of the court. 
Burrows suggests it is an open question as to whether the court could 
provide a penalty for a breach in excess of that allowed in statute under the 
grounds of a contempt of court, where the case is of a flagrant and intentional 
disobedience of the court,. 149 
While the case law in New Zealand is limited, Williams Jin C v Wilson 
& Horton indicated that publishing an accused's name before their first 
appearance, may be a contempt of court, as it circumvents the ability of the court 
to grant a request of name suppression. 150 In that case, the court granted an 
interim injunction to stop the publication of the name of a man under 
investigation by the serious fraud office. 
A Strict Liability 
A breach of a name suppression order is a strict liability offence. The 
offence is made out on proof of publication of the suppressed information. Once 
publication is demonstrated, the onus then falls on the person accused of the 
,-1, Solicitor-General v Smith [2004] 2 NZLR 540. 
1-1s Cri.tn.inalJustice Act 1985, s141 . 
1-1 9 Burrows (ed) J\/Iedia Law In New Zealand (4th ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland,1999) 248. 
15° C v Wilson and H orton Ltd (27 May 1992) H C AK CP 765/ 92. 
breach, to show that they took reasonable care in the circumstances, so to have 
avoided the breach. 151 If the person meets that onus, then there is a complete 
absence of fault. 152 
B Publication 
Publication occurs by disclosing and bringing suppressed information in 
to the public domain. 153 "Publication" need not only be in the news media, and 
can include distribution of the suppressed information in other forms such as in 
hl · h · 154 155 pamp ets, or via t e internet. 
C Penalty 
The penalty for breach of a suppress10n order under the CJA is a 
maximum fine of $1 OOO. Some commentators have opined that the penalty is too 
low to act as a real deterrent, particularly to a large media company. The 
argument is that the business may obtain more in revenue as a direct result of 
publication, than the maximum penalty under the Act. It has been the practice of 
the Crown when bringing a prosecution for the breach of a suppression order, to 
name the media organisation as the defendant, rather than individuals within that 
organisation. However, that is not to say that individual reporters or editors 
could not be prosecuted. 
151 Karam v Solicitor-General (20 _>\ugust 1999) HC AK :\P50/ 98 Gendall J. 
i52 Millar v MOT [1 986] 1 ZLR 660. 
153 Solititor-General v Smith [2004] 2 NZLR 540. 
154 Sullivan v Hamel-Green [1 970] 'VR 156. 
155 Re X (A victim: name suppression) [2002] ZAR 938. 
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XIV APPEALS AGAINST NAME SUPPRESSION DECISIONS 
Appeals from decisions of the District Court regarding suppression of 
name in the summary jurisdiction can be made in the High Court, pursuant to 
section 115 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957. District Court decisions 
made during a trial can also be appealed to the High Court in terms of section 
28E(2B) of the District Courts Act 1947. With regard to matters before the High 
Court, leave to appeal a decision from that court 1s made under section 
379A(l)(BA). Following the trial, the application 1s made under section 
383(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1961. 
Where a party indicates to the District Court that they are likely to appeal 
its decision to decline a suppression order, an interim order it typically granted 
by the District Court Judge under section 115C(2) of the Summary Proceeding 
Act 1957, to protect the position of the applicant, pending any appeal to the High 
Court. Because the grant of a suppression order is a discretionary matter for the 
court, to succeed in an appeal, the appellant court must accept that either the 
lower court acted on some wrong legal principle, or was clearly wrong. 156 
156 Victim Xv Television New Zealand Ltd (2003] 3 ZLR 220, R v L"dde/1 (1 995] 1 ZLR 538 (C.\). 
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XVI AUTOMATIC PRE-JUDGMENT NAME SUPPRESSION 
In the author's opinion, the law should be developed toward a system 
where the default position with all criminal charges is automatic pre-judgment 
name suppression. As noted above, automatic name suppression is already a 
feature of the New Zealand criminal justice system, and can be seen other 
jurisdictions. 157 While the starting position should be automatic suppression of 
an accused ' s name, any development of the law should also allow an application 
to be made to the court for release of the accused name at the discretion of the 
court. It is likely situations would arise where sound reasons would exist for 
publishing an accused ' s name. Those might include for example, situations 
where there is evidence of other victims within the community, and publishing 
the name of the accused may encourage other victims to come forward. 
By having the suppression automatic only to the point of judgment, that 
then gives the court the opportunity on giving its judgment, to either allow the 
accused to be named, or to maintain a suppression if the circumstances dictate. 
157 For example, cases where the accused is a child, or an automatic suppression applied under 
section 138 of the CJA. 
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XVI ARGUMENTS FOR PRE-JUDGMENT NAME SUPPRESSION 
The issue as to the extent any information should be suppressed within 
the courts, has been a question for as long as the courts have been open to the 
public and media. The issues to be considered are largely not new, but there are 
contemporary circumstances which must be considered which result from living 
in a modem age, with differing imperatives in today's society. 
As discussed above, the courts have recognised there is generally three 
broad timeframes in a criminal prosecution where the considerations for name 
suppression vary. These are before the first appearance, between the first 
appearance and judgrnent, and following a judgrnent. Given this paper relates to 
pre-judgrnent name suppression, the following discussion will centre on the first 
and second timeframes. However, much of the discussion will be relevant for 
the third timeframe, being post judgrnent. 
A The Fair Trial Requirement 
It is clear the most important and consistent priority for the court when 
considering a request for suppression, is the requirement to ensure a fair trial. 
The requirement to ensure a fair trial , is an imperative for the benefit of all 
parties, but most importantly the accused. This requirement can be seen in the 
many rules and laws regarding the conduct of criminal trials . While some mles 
and laws are in place to protect victims, the vast majority are in place to ensure 
the accused receives a fair trial. 158 The primary aim of a trial is to b1ing the 
alleged offender to justice - if they are guilty. In western societies this is 
typically achieved by bringing the person before the court, and having an 
appropriate penalty imposed where required. Accordingly, while a trial will have 
the benefit of achieving some catharsis for the victim and society, it is primarily 
centred on the offender. 
158 For example, the rules surrounding the giving o f evidence fo r victims of sexual o ffending, and 
particularly their examination. 
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available to allow the accused to avoid the detrimental effects from conviction 
and sentence in appropriate cases. Publication of a persons name seriously 
affects the efficacy of a diversion for the accused. Ensuring all names are 
suppressed, will ensure that all accused have the prospects of the full range of 
outcomes from the court. 
B Publication is a penalty to an innocent person 
One of the longest standing principles in the criminal law, is that the 
accused is innocent until proven guilty. As was recognised in the Court of 
Appeal judgment of R v B, the presumption of innocence is often an important 
factor in an application for bail, but is somewhat ignored when considering a 
request for suppression of name. It is simply wrong to suggest that when the 
Police make a decision to charge a person, they are always correct. There are 
frequent reports of cases where a person is subsequently proven not to have 
committed the crime for which they were charged. The Legal Services Agency 
report that in the Auckland and Manukau District Courts for example, only 76% 
of defendants were convicted. The remainder of the charges resulted in either 
withdrawal, dismissal or acquittal. In a practical sense, this means that in 24% of 
cases the person should be considered innocent. 
Until the person is found guilty of the charge they are innocent, and must 
in law be considered as such. The author suggests there would be few cases 
where the publication of an accused name, would not be a penalty for that 
person. The penalty may result from the direct humiliation to the accused from 
their name being associated with offending, or the penalty may be secondary, 
such as the effects on the persons business or career. In the eyes of the law, a 
person acquitted of a charge must be released free of penalty. However in 
practice, the person may be acquitted only to face a continued penalty from 
society, which cannot be just. 
C Effect of Technology 
Developments in technology, and particularly the internet, mean a person 
may be affected by a charge longer than they would have in earlier times. Prior 
to the availability of the internet, a person's name being associated with a charge 
may only last as long as the general memory of the community, and would 
dissipate with the mists of time and be forgotten. For members of the public, 
searching court records or archived newspapers for a particular person would be 
a difficulty task, and as such rarely occur. However, with the internet, we can 
readily access large amounts of information on a person from a wide range of 
sources, which may have been archived back many years. Therefore the effect 
on a person from a charge, even when found not guilty, may potentially be with 
the person for their life-time. 
D Reduced invasion on the accused 
A fundamental principle in a free society is the ability of citizens to be 
free from unjust invasion of the state. Considerable invasion can occur simply as 
the result of being charged with an offence under the criminal law. As observed 
by the Law Commission: 159 
At the very least the citizen is charged with an offence, usually required to attend a court 
hearing, publicly described as a suspect, and turned into a defendant. The defendant 
may have been finger printed, and detained in a cell, possibly overnight, before the cowt 
hearing ... . The very reliability of the criminal process invites the public to doubt the 
i1mocence of anyone brought before the court. Name suppression is exceptional. 
The publication of a person's name and the details of their charge would, 
the author suggests, be likely to have a significant effect on those named. 
Furthermore, those nan1ed persons are likely to be perceived negatively within 
the community. Notwithstanding any subsequent findings of the court, the 
159 Law Com.mission Compensating the 111rong!y convicted report 49, Law Com.mission, \Vellington 1998. 
person will be perceived as guilty by a proportion of society, based merely on 
having been charged. Automatic suppression of name will go some way to limit 
the invasion of the person by the state. 
E Administrative Efficiency 
An application for suppression of name, or appealing a courts decision 
regarding a suppression has a cost. The costs relate to the expense for counsel 
and the court, as well as the consumption of precious court time. Providing for 
automatic suppression of name may reduce the cost associated with the current 
system. However, if there is provision to apply to have a name released (as I 
have proposed), that would result in a cost, which would depend on the 
frequency of applications. 
F Greater Certainty 
Under the current name suppression system, it can be uncertain whether any 
particular accused person has a name suppression order. That is because there is 
no register of suppression orders, and the order is typically given orally in court. 
A difficulty for the media arises when the reporter leaves court prior to the 
conclusion of the hearing day, and may miss an order being given. Furthermore, 
the media have reported difficulties in finding whether a name suppression order 
has been granted in any particular case. 160 
160 _-\s stated by the announcer on Radio ew Zealand, 'Morning Report', 17 Sep tember 2008. 
XV ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRE-JUDGMENT NAME SUPPRESSION 
Just as there are arguments for more liberal application of suppression 
orders, so too there are arguments against more liberalisation. Some of the more 
significant arguments are discussed as follows: 
A Encroachment on the right to freedom of speech 
A significant and longstanding right is the right to freedom of speech. 
Closely aligned to the right to impart information, is the right to receive 
information. In the context of a granted suppression order, these rights are 
encroached in that the media (typically) are restricted in their ability to impart 
information, and the public are restricted in their ability to receive that 
information. Many would argue that society should resile against any further 
imoads on the import right to freedom of speech. 
It must however be recognised that any restriction on publication is 
limited to the extent of the suppression order from the court, or the automatic 
suppression that results from statutory restrictions. With regard to name 
suppression, these restrictions are normally limited to the persons name, and 
identifying particulars. Importantly, the media typically remain free to report on 
any other details of the crime, charge or hearing. It must also be recognised that 
under the current criminal justice process, there are already frequent cases where 
name suppression is granted, or an accused will receive an automatic statutory 
name suppress10n. 
The question should be considered that, even if there is a restriction of 
publication of name prior to a judgment, is that a significant limitation on the 
right to freedom of speech. As noted above, the media are likely to remain able 
to publish wide ranging infonnation in relation to the crime, charge or hearing, 
so perhaps the answer is 'no'. 
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B Protection of the Public 
A frequently cited reason to avoid name suppression is that publication of 
the persons name will allow the public to be protected from someone who may 
be a danger to the public. When the public is made aware of a possible criminal 
within their community (given that the person has been charged with an offence), 
individuals can make up their own minds as to whether they avoid contact with 
that person. Similarly, it might be argued that by naming the accused, even if 
they are acquitted of the crime, or the charge is withdrawn, that the public can 
still choose to avoid the person 'in case they are actually guilty'. 
One of the flaws with that argument, is that typically when Police 
consider a person is a danger to the community, they will either oppose bail so 
the person remains in custody, or seek the imposition of bail conditions so as to 
limit the persons risk of any continued potential offending. For example, where 
a person has a history of committing crimes under the influence of alcohol, the 
Police would normally seek a bail condition that that the person does not 
consume alcohol while on bail. 
Furthermore, in a proportion of cases of sexual offending, the accused's 
name will be suppressed where there is any risk of identification of the alleged 
victim. In those cases community risk cannot be lowered by publication of 
name, but is often limited with bail conditions (such as not associating with the 
victim, or children etc ). 
C Interests of the Public 
Some would argue against suppression of names, because society has an 
inherent desire to know what is going on, especially if the accused is of public 
interest. In these situations, the desire to know who is before the courts may not 
be for functioning of our society, but more from an interest in 'salacious' news 
stories. 
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D Interests of the Media 
In the author's opinion, any more liberal application of name suppression 
may directly affect the business of the media. Simply put, limiting the extent to 
which the media can identify accused persons, directly affects their ability to 
produce interesting stories. This in tum may affect profitability of that media 
organisation. 
E Encouraging Other Victims to Come Forward 
Another often cited reason to publish an accused name is to encourage 
other victims to come forward. The author acknowledges there may be cases 
where publication of a persons name will result in other victims coming forward, 
and so potentially result in other prosecutions. However the question must be 
considered as to whether publication of name prior to a judgment would have 
any greater effect than publication after a conviction, in bringing victims 
forward. 
It is acknowledged that the argument could be raised that if the person is 
acquitted, then there would not be the opportunity to publish the persons name, 
and so therefore the opportunity would be missed to encourage others to come 
forward (if the person has in fact offended against others). However, given the 
proposition above that there should be an ability to apply to the court to allow the 
release of accused's name, if there was evidence of other offending, then an 
application could be brought, and the accused's name potentially released. 
F Absence of Publicity May Result in Suspicion Falling On Others 
The courts have acknowledged that a benefit of naming an accused, is 
that it ensures that suspicion from the public does not fall on other, non-involved 
persons. There could be little doubt that the act of publicly naming the accused 
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will go some way to ensuring the community do not suspect other persons as 
having committed the proposed crime. As stated in Lewis v WH: 161 
. .. The best protection against speculation is the freedom to receive and impart 
information recognised by s 14 of the ew Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. A full 
report of what transpired ... would be a complete answer to a baseless rumour and 
conjecture. 
In the authors opinion, this argument is flawed for two reasons. Firstly, it 
is premised on the view that the particular crime is one where others might be 
suspected. The author would suggest that with the majority of crimes, the people 
who have knowledge of that crime will know who either committed it or is 
accused of having done so. In those cases the individuals will either have first 
hand knowledge of the alleged offender, or the Police would have informed the 
victim as part of their routine processes. 
Secondly, the cases where suspicion may be in issue, is likely to be those 
cases reported by the media. As noted earlier in this paper, it is only a minority 
of criminal charges which result in publication in the media. Furthermore, often 
the cases reported by the media are cases of serious offending, for which a 
significant proportion of accused will be remanded in custody, which the media 
would no doubt report. That fact should significant lower the 1isk of others being 
suspected (if the accused is in custody, suspicion could not realistically fall on a 
person at large in the community). 
It is acknowledged there may be an issue with suspicion falling on others, 
when the media report the case citing a group the accused is involved with (for 
example, "an All Black appeared in court charged with assault ... "). These 
situations could be remedied either by the media being more cautious on how 
they choose to refer to an accused ith name suppression, considering the effect 
of suspicion falling on others, or by an application to the court to name the 
accused if suspicion on others in that particular case was a material issue. 
161 Le1JJis v Wilson & Horton Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 546. 
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XVIII HOW SHOULD THE NEW ZEALAND LAW BE DEVELOPED? 
In the author's opinion, the New Zealand law should be developed to 
allow for automatic pre-judgment name suppression of accused. However any 
development should allow for applications to be made to vary or release an 
accused's name for publication. 
Given the long and well settled common law regarding name suppression, 
any development as proposed above would need to be the result of changes to 
statute. Given the relevance of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 to the issue of 
name suppression, any development may be centred on an amendment to that 
Act. 
XIX CONCLUSION 
The law surrounding name suppression in criminal cases in New Zealand 
has developed from the common law, but is now also contained in a number of 
statutes, primarily the Criminal Justice Act 1985. The consistent starting point 
for any application for name suppression has been that the name should be 
released due to the principle of open justice and freedom of expression. To 
succeed in an application for name suppression, the applicant's burden is 
significant. A strong factor for suppression is when there is any risk of 
jeopardising a fair trial, otherwise interests such as privacy, presumption of 
innocence, or other factor relating to the accused are likely to be of secondary 
consideration to the court. 
It must be recognised that the law in New Zealand, as well as in other 
jurisdictions, is developing to recognise a greater personal interest in privacy. 
There could be little doubt that publication of a person's name in relation to an 
accusation of criminal offending, would be a significant invasion of that persons 
privacy, and may have significant if not devastating effects on that person, or 
their family. Those effects may be disproportionate to the charge, or wholly 
unwarranted if the person was in fact innocent. The courts have recognised these 
significant effects from publication of an accused's name. 
In the authors op1mon there are strong arguments for the law to be 
developed to provide an automatic suppression of an accused's name in criminal 
cases, with the ability to apply to the comi to release the name of the accused, 
and hence to allow publication at the discretion of the court. This is essentially a 
reverse presumption to the current law. As the majority of criminal charges are 
for generally minor offending, and as such unlikely to be reported in any event, 
any development in the law would only have a likely effect on a minority of 
those charged, albeit those facing more serious charges, or accused persons who 
are of public interest. 
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V APPENDIX I 
Criminal Justice Act 1985 
138 Power to clear court and forbid report of proceedings 
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of 
any other enactment, every sitting of any court dealing with any 
proceedings in respect of an offence shall be open to the public. 
(2) Where a court is of the opinion that the interests of justice, or of public 
morality, or of the reputation of any victim of any alleged sexual offence 
or offence of extortion, or of the security or defence of New Zealand so 
require, it may make any one or more of the following orders: 
(a) An order forbidding publication of any report or account of the 
whole or any part of-
(i) The evidence adduced; or 
(ii) The submissions made: 
(b) An order forbidding the publication of the name of any witness or 
witnesses, or any name or particulars likely to lead to the 
identification of the witness or witnesses: 
( c) Subject to subsection (3) of this section, an order excluding all or 
any persons other than the informant, any member of the Police, 
the defendant, any counsel engaged in the proceedings, and any 
officer of the court from the whole or any part of the proceedings. 
(3) The power conferred by paragraph (c) of subsection (2) of this section 
shall not, except where the interests of security or defence so require, be 
exercised so as to exclude any accredited news media reporter. 
(4) An order made under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of 
this section-
( a) May be made for a limited period or permanently; and 
(b) If it is made for a limited period, may be renewed for a further 
period or periods by the court; and 
(c) If it is made permanently, may be reviewed by the court at any 
time. 
(5) The powers conferred by this section to make orders of any kind 
described in subsection (2) of this section are in substitution for any such 
powers that a court may have had under any inherent jurisdiction or any 
rule of law; and no court shall have power to make any order of any such 
kind except in accordance with this section or any other enactment. 
(6) Notwithstanding that an order is made under subsection (2)(c) of this 
section, the announcement of the verdict or decision of the court 
(including a decision to commit the defendant for trial or sentence) and 
the passing of sentence shall in every case take place in public; but, if the 
court is satisfied that exceptional circumstances so require, it may decline 
to state in public all or any of the facts, reasons, or other considerations 
that it has taken into account in reaching its decision or verdict or in 
determining the sentence passed by it on any defendant. 
(7) Every person commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to 
a fine not exceeding $1,000 who commits a breach of any order made 
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under paragraph ( a) or paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section or 
evades or attempts to evade any such order. 
(8) The breach of any order made under subsection (2)( c) of this section, or 
any evasion or attempted evasion of it, may be dealt with as contempt of 
court. 
(9) Nothing in this section shall limit the powers of the court under sections 
139 and 140 of this Act to prohibit the publication of any name. 
139 Prohibition against publication of names in specified sexual cases 
(lAA) The purpose of this section is to protect persons upon or with whom an 
offence referred to in subsection (1) or subsection (2) has been, or is 
alleged to have been, committed. 
(1) No person shall publish, in any report or account relating to any 
proceedings commenced in any court in respect of an offence against any 
of sections 128 to 142A of the Crimes Act 1961, or in respect of an 
offence against section 144A of that Act, the name of any person upon or 
with whom the offence has been or is alleged to have been committed, or 
any name or particulars likely to lead to the identification of that person, 
unless-
(a) That person is of or over the age of 16 years; and 
(b) The court, by order, permits such publication. 
(1 A) However, the court must make an order referred to in subsection (1 )(b ), 
permitting any person to publish the name of a person upon or with 
whom any offence referred to in subsection (1) has been or is alleged to 
have been committed, or any name or particulars likely to lead to the 
identification of that person, if-
( a) that person-
(i) is aged 16 years or older (whether or not he or she was 
aged 16 years or older when the offence was, or is alleged 
to have been, committed); and 
(ii) applies to the court for such an order; and 
(b) the court is satisfied that that person understands the nature and 
effect of his or her decision to apply to the court for such an order. 
(2) No person shall publish, in any report or account relating to proceedings 
in respect of an offence against section 130 or section 131 of the Crimes 
Act 1961, the name of the person accused or convicted of the offence or 
any name or particulars likely to lead to the person's identification. 
(2A) However, a court must order that any person may publish the name of a 
person convicted of an offence against section 130 or section 131 of the 
Crimes Act 1961, or any name or particulars likely to lead to the person's 
identification, if-
( a) the victim ( or, ifthere were 2 or more victims of the offence, each 
victim) of the offence-
(i) is aged 16 years or older (whether or not he or she was 
aged 16 years or older when the offence was, or is alleged 
to have been, committed); and 
(ii) applies to the court for such an order; and 
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(b) the court is satisfied that the victim ( or, as the case requires, each 
victim) of the offence understands the nature and effect of his or 
her decision to apply to the court for such an order; and 
(c) No order or further order has been made under section 140 
prohibiting the publication of the name, address, or occupation, of 
the person convicted of the offence, or of any particulars likely to 
lead to that person's identification. 
(2B) An order made under subsection (2A) in respect of the name of a person, 
or of any name or particulars likely to lead to the identification of a 
person, ceases to have effect if-
( a) the person applies to a court for an order or further order under 
section 140 prohibiting the publication of his or her name, 
address, or occupation, or of any particulars likely to lead to his or 
her identification; and 
(b) the court makes the order or further order under section 140. 
(3) Every person commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to 
a fine not exceeding $1 ,000 who publishes any name or particular in 
contravention of subsection (1) or subsection (2) of this section. 
139A Prohibition against publication of names in specified sexual cases 
(lAA) The purpose of this section is to protect persons upon or with whom an 
offence referred to in subsection (1) or subsection (2) has been, or is 
alleged to have been, committed. 
(1) No person shall publish, in any report or account relating to any 
proceedings commenced in any court in respect of an offence against any 
of sections 128 to 142A of the Crimes Act 1961, or in respect of an 
offence against section 144A of that Act, the name of any person upon or 
with whom the offence has been or is alleged to have been committed, or 
any name or particulars likely to lead to the identification of that person, 
unless-
(a) That person is of or over the age of 16 years; and 
(b) The court, by order, permits such publication. 
(lA) However, the court must make an order referred to in subsection (l)(b), 
permitting any person to publish the name of a person upon or with 
whom any offence referred to in subsection (1) has been or is alleged to 
have been committed, or any name or particulars likely to lead to the 
identification of that person, if-
( a) that person-
(i) is aged 16 years or older (whether or not he or she was 
aged 16 years or older when the offence was, or is alleged 
to have been, committed); and 
(ii) applies to the court for such an order; and 
(b) the court is satisfied that that person understands the nature and 
effect of his or her decision to apply to the court for such an order. 
(2) No person shall publish, in any report or account relating to proceedings 
in respect of an offence against section 130 or section 131 of the Crimes 
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Act 1961, the name of the person accused or convicted of the offence or 
any name or particulars likely to lead to the person's identification. 
(2A) However, a court must order that any person may publish the name of a 
person convicted of an offence against section 130 or section 131 of the 
Crimes Act 1961 , or any name or particulars likely to lead to the person's 
identification, if-
(a) the victim (or, ifthere were 2 or more victims of the offence, each 
victim) of the offence-
(i) is aged 16 years or older (whether or not he or she was 
aged 16 years or older when the offence was, or is alleged 
to have been, committed); and 
(ii) applies to the court for such an order; and 
(b) the court is satisfied that the victim ( or, as the case requires, each 
victim) of the offence understands the nature and effect of his or 
her decision to apply to the court for such an order; and 
(c) No order or further order has been made under section 140 
prohibiting the publication of the name, address, or occupation, of 
the person convicted of the offence, or of any particulars likely to 
lead to that person's identification. 
(2B) An order made under subsection (2A) in respect of the name of a person, 
or of any name or particulars likely to lead to the identification of a 
person, ceases to have effect if-
( a) the person applies to a court for an order or further order under 
section 140 prohibiting the publication of his or her name, 
address, or occupation, or of any particulars likely to lead to his or 
her identification; and 
(b) the court makes the order or further order under section 140. 
(3) Every person commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to 
a fine not exceeding $1,000 who publishes any name or particular in 
contravention of subsection (1) or subsection (2) of this section. 
140 Court may prohibit publication of names 
(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in any enactment, a court may 
make an order prohibiting the publication, in any report or account relating to 
any proceedings in respect of an offence, of the name, address, or occupation of 
the person accused or convicted of the offence, or of any other person connected 
with the proceedings, or any particulars likely to lead to any such person's 
identification. 
(2) Any such order may be made to have effect only for a limited period, 
whether fixed in the order or to terminate in accordance with the order; or if it is 
not so made, it shall have effect pennanently. 
(3) If any such order is expressed to have effect until the determination of an 
intended appeal, and no notice of appeal or of application for leave to appeal is 
filed or given within the time limited or allowed by or under the relevant 
enactment, the order shall cease to have effect on the expiry of that time; but if 
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such a notice is given within that time, the order shall cease to have effect on the 
determination of the appeal or on the occurrence or non-occurrence of any event 
as a result of which the proceedings or prospective proceedings are brought to an 
end . 
(4) The making under this section of an order having effect only for a limited 
period shall not prevent any court from making under this section any further 
order having effect either for a limited period or permanently. 
( 4A) When determining whether to make any such order or further order in 
respect of a person accused or convicted of an offence and having effect 
pennanently, a court must take into account any views of a victim of the offence, 
or of a parent or legal guardian of a victim of the offence, conveyed in 
accordance with section 28 of the Victims' Rights Act 2002. 
(5) Every person commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to 
a fine not exceeding $1,000 who commits a breach of any order made under this 
section or evades or attempts to evade any such order. 
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